

issue at stake from the philosophical standpoint, since science does not pronounce upon the exclusive competence of its own descriptive systems.

Transactions as namings are unfractured observations, involving a system of description for dealing with phases of behavior. Yet because this purpose can be achieved without referring to powers and causes, no conclusion follows concerning the existing participants in the transaction as modes of being. The latter consideration may require more than is needed to complete a scientific description. Dewey and Bentley rightly ridicule the notions of a substance existing without its powers, and a power lurking detachedly behind its activities. The experiential reality is indeed man-in-action. But a theory of substance, powers, and causality need not fall victim to this way of thinking. Opposing the tendency toward hypostatization of principles of being is quite another affair than sidetracking metaphysics. It is, indeed, the surest way to render the distinctively metaphysical questions about unity, cause, and distinction more urgent than ever. The authors beg to be allowed to "cultivate the garden of our choice" (p. 60). This is only their right. But it is notorious that for Candide his own garden soon became the entire world. At this point, a man's castle becomes a prison, wherein he has no right to confine others.

JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis University

SYMBOL AND METAPHOR IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE. By Martin Foss. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 205. \$3.00.

A book such as this has long been in demand, and it is well that the book has come from so competent a source as Professor Foss. Metaphor, called *translatio* or "transference" by earlier rhetoricians, is a focal point for much current literary analysis. More than ever before, literary theory today is intrigued by this transference of a term from one object to another which allows the term, even while applying to the second object, to continue somehow to signify the first object as well.

Metaphor has two aspects. It can be regarded as suggesting that the second object is really the first, when it is not. To regard metaphor this way makes often for mere querulousness at the ubiquity of metaphor in human discourse. But metaphor can also be regarded as a process of conjunction quite at home within the general economy of human knowledge inasmuch as this knowledge is at root always a process of conjunction, of bringing one term to bear on another. There can be little doubt that the unique place occupied by metaphor among

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the science does not describe systems. Judgments, involving a subject and a predicate. Yet because of the difference between effects and causes, no judgments in the transaction may require more than Dewey and Bentley without its powers,

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as suggesting that judgment to regard metaphor judgment of ubiquity of meta- judgment to be regarded as judgment of a general economy of judgment at root always a judgment on another. There judgment of metaphor among

the vivifying devices of discourse is due to the fact that the bifocal nature of metaphor, its juncture of two things to make a sort of one, is reminiscent of the structure of judgment, the juncture of subject and predicate—which, as St. Thomas explains, come together as matter and form to make the judgment an *unum per se*.

But the metaphor is more than suggestive of the judgment. In a certain fashion—which is, be it owned, a little restless and uneasy with itself—the metaphor is more compressed than the judgment since it compacts two terms in one in a way which avoids the more obvious duality of predication. Predication carries on, *componendo et dividendo*, by means of patently separate subject and predicate terms; but by its peculiar compression metaphor hints at a simpler manner of knowing than this, that exercised by pure spirits, in which the two-membered judgment is replaced, and transcended, by a simple, indivisible act. (It is interesting to observe here how St. Thomas, approaching this problem from another point, assigns metaphor a place within the science of theology because the subject matter of this science is above the range of human reason, and, conversely, a place also in poetry because here the matter is below the range of human reason. [*In Sent.*, prolog., q. 1, a. 5 ad 3; cf. *ST*, I. 1. 9.])

With a framework such as this to work in, Professor Foss sets metaphor against symbol as the living against the dead, process against sterile image. To him the chase after "ideas," lately become rather a rat race, presents little temptation. With his attention trained on the process at the live center of human intellection—the center which St. Thomas was regarding when he insisted that we know not by concepts as such, but *componendo et dividendo*—the author conveys some wonderfully acute insights not only into human experience in general, but especially into the artistic and poetic process and into the nature of tragedy and comedy. There are some excellent observations on the resemblances and differences between art and religion and on the function of prayer, as well as on the nature of melody as against harmony. (In this last matter, while endorsing the larger point concerning the relationship of melody and harmony, I myself am tempted to quarrel with the suggestion that the choral parts of Beethoven's *Ninth* are a return to pure melody, for these have always seemed to me melodically more than suspect—disassembled harmonies more than sheer melody.)

Because the author's "symbol" and "metaphor" represent at one level or pitch the bipolarity which rides through all created reality, they can be made to illuminate almost anything, and are. But, without denying the author's real achievement, one must note what happens when

this particular pitch of the bipolarity is preferred as the ultimate reduction over the potency-act, or even the matter-form, pitch. Approaching reality in terms of expression, one is engaged with being at one remove from itself. The world of symbol and metaphor is the world of (human) intellect, not of immediate actuality, no matter how much you make it come alive. And in the statement that causality is a "metaphorical process of substance" (p. 67) and similar statements, although one can see what the author means, connections have become so tenuous that the introduction of metaphor as a term of comparison appears more a tour de force than an explanation.

To process reality in terms of apprehension and expression often entails considerable reduction of field—specialization in one aspect of things to the neglect of others. Perhaps because of this reduction, the reality of ritual and priesthood is considered by the author solely as rationalistic. (What would Voltaire have said to this?) One is made to forget that these things are in fact two-sided, rationalistic or symbolically reduced insofar as opposed to actuality, but nonrationalistic or "superstitious" as against scientific statement. Hence it is that attacks on ritual vacillate, badgering it now for one thing now for the other. By a similar reduction, "analogy" seems to become mere allegory here, and "symbol" itself becomes mere representation, static image, whereas in Kafka or his commentator Brod and elsewhere, it is precisely symbol which is fecund by contrast with allegory, which is static.

Where it functions in the open, this reduction of terms is legitimate enough and, indeed, desirable. Another sort of reduction is perhaps less so. In a fashion which seems to be a vogue particularly of the past decade or so, enthusiasm sometimes leads the author to state an insight with a slight distortion which makes it play just beyond the bounds where it really belongs. This makes for exciting effects, and it keeps the reader alert. Writing of this sort is not dull, but it isn't quite fair either. Thus "contradictions" are said to be predicated of God (p. 79); but the instances given include not one single contradiction (affirmation and denial of the same thing) nor even contraries, but only paradoxes. In like manner, *creatio ex nihilo* is given quite a torque (pp. 62 and 72). Here one detects the hectic fascination with nothingness, negation, and contradiction which threads here and there through this book and more than once suggests Meister Eckhart, who does come in for his meed of praise (p. 79).

The fact that he becomes involved with problems of existence while handling them at one or two removes helps account for the author's assertion that existence is a process (p. 67) and that person is a

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process (p. 3 comes about to existence "experience"—of existence to which the au seems live and based on the would be.

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the ultimate reduction. Approaching it at one remove from the world of (human) things, such as you make it, is a "metaphorical" process, although one can see how so tenuous that it appears more a

expression often in one aspect of his reduction, the author solely as a symbolist? One is made to feel that the rationalistic or symbolist or non-rationalistic or that it attacks the ground for the other. There is allegory here, a symbolic image, whereas the symbol is precisely symbolic. The symbol is legitimate. The reduction is perhaps particularly of the past to state an insight beyond the bounds of objects, and it keeps it isn't quite fair to say that the Kingdom of God (p. 79); the reduction (affirmation of only paradoxes. (pp. 62 and 72). The symbol, negation, and this book and more in for his need of existence while for the author's that person is a

process (p. 35). One could well agree that apprehension of existence comes about through process, and one can understand why an approach to existence which backtracks through apprehension and expression—"experience"—would lead one to speak this way. But is not the reduction of existence to process the very *ne plus ultra* in the symbolic reduction which the author so rightly maintains cannot be ultimate? Process seems live and full of promise, but one suspects that its appeal is really based on the fact that it is a much more tractable term than existence would be.

WALTER J. ONG, S.J.

*Cambridge University
England*

THE KING AND THE EDUCATION OF THE KING (DE REGE ET REGIS INSTITUTIONE, BOOK I.) By Juan de Mariana. An English Translation and Criticism by George Albert Moore. Washington: Country Dollar Press, 1948. Pp. xxiii + 440. \$5.00.

The sixteenth century is of crucial importance in the formation of modern political thought. If it is true that the structure of sixteenth-century political thought is still medieval, the quality of the thought is not so certain. One may fairly say that the world of political ideas was in an unstable and momentary equilibrium which was to be destroyed by the introduction of the notions of absolute royal rule and the right to resist. The defenders of the right of resistance, both Catholic and Protestant, sought naturally to elaborate a theory of the people's right which should derive political authority from the people. This was, of course, a traditional doctrine; but the significant thing about the sixteenth-century tracts dealing with this matter is their prolix, poor, ambiguous, and superficial statement of it. There emerges from the literature the primacy of the natural man as the most fundamental moral fact: the innate social propensity of man is raised to the level of a sufficient explanation of social groupings in such a way that later, with the seventeenth-century theoreticians, no law is left to be observed which the moral subject has not given to himself. This has been called the "nontheological view of civil society," and many authors credit Juan de Mariana with this view. The notion of a nontheological natural law is self-evidently meaningless to those who understand the terms; but it has, nonetheless, if we may speak in the style of St. Thomas, a *historical* meaning for the ignorant.