BOOK REVIEWS

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The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy: A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structures. By E. M. Barth. Translated by E. M. Barth and T. C. Potts. "Synthese Historical Library," Vol. 10. Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1974. Pp. xxviii + 533. $56.00.

This translation, by the author herself and a collaborator, of the original Dutch *De Logica van de lidwoorden in de traditionele filosofie* (1971) makes available to the English-speaking world a highly original work of major importance not only in formal logic but also in general philosophy. The use of the definite and indefinite articles and/or their equivalents (as in languages such as Latin which have no articles) is extraordinarily complex and crucial for formal logic and for understanding the relationship of logic to general philosophy.

The problems of logical structure raised by the use of articles are knotty. Some can be seen in this quartet of concepts: (1) "this rose" (individual, concrete); (2) "the red of this rose" (abstract red, individualized by "this rose"); (3) "the (a) rose" (concrete universal—the singular representing somehow all of the class—expressed in English by "a," as in the assertion "a rose is a flover," but in French, German, and other languages by "the," *la rose est une fleur;* (4) "the nature of the rose" (universal abstract).

Dr. Barth finds the use of the "concrete universal" a typical soft spot in the so-called "traditional logic." This logic is that espoused, for example, in various ways by A. Pfänder, Bruno Baron von Freitag Löringhof, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, Jacques Maritain, and Henry B. Veatch, earlier by Kant and Hegel, probably by Edmund Husserl, and by recent "scholastic" logicians generally. Such logic, including its announcedly "scholastic" versions, is rooted not in medieval scholasticism but rather in the period 1450-1700, a period of residual and not-so-formal logic characterized by exclusion of many of the most significant major advances in logic made by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholasticism. This "traditional" late logic contrasts both with medieval formal logic and with the later formal logic developed by Gottlob Frege and his successors. In confrontation with Fregean and post-Fregean logic, the practitioners of present-day "traditional" logic are highly defensive; with full-blown medieval logic the same present-day "traditional" logic has had almost no direct contact at all.

Definite articles (in Latin the zero article and often in English the indefinite article, as in example 3 here above), Dr. Barth finds, are much

used in "traditional" philosophy and in such a way that the logical form of the sentences in which they occur cannot be recognized. The medieval logicians had not solved the problems of the logic of the articles, but they had been seriously concerned with the problems and had worked with them, whereas the Renaissance logicians from whom "traditional" logic derives had forgotten the existence of the problems. Both Kant's formal logic and Hegel's come off pretty badly as formal logics under Dr. Barth's close scrutiny: they are close to amateur, Hegel's "slovenly" (p. 478). Ramus' influence on Hegel, which has been attracting the growing attention of scholars recently, is shown to be considerable via the pervasive Ramism diffused through the German intellectual heritage.

Dr. Barth traces many of the aberrations she discovers in logicians to a compulsive drive toward what she calls "logical stability," connected with a preference for symmetrical and apparently quiescent, reposeful paradigms as against dynamic ones. She suggests that formal logic must be an open rather than a closed system (these terms, open system and closed system, are mine, however, not hers, though I believe quite faithful to her thought). A purportedly closed-system logic (which Kant blindly believed in, and to the point where he was convinced that Aristotle had not only begun but also pretty well completed logic as a science) Dr. Barth shows to be always in fact open to the nonlogical world. Her demonstration is effected not by "traditionalist" invocation of a "material logic" underlying formal logic (you've got to know what I *really* mean) but by rooting formal logic in the situation in which it historically, and, as it would seem, of necessity came into being: a dialogic situation, governed by rhetoric. (The psychological growth of formal logic out of rhetoric, with which Dr. Barth is not directly concerned, is brilliantly examined in terms of the relationship of consciousness to the unconscious by Gilbert Durand in his *Les Structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire*, a book crying to be translated into English.) Formal logic originated out of attempts to answer the question, Why does what you say demolish what I say? The frame of formal logic is thus ultimately not structure but dialogue, interpersonal relations, scandalous though this may appear. Indeed, such syncategorematic terms as "any," which lie at the heart of much formal logic, depend directly for their meanings on a choice at least presumed to be made by one of the interlocutors in a conversation, as P. Lorenzen's dialogic tableaus (related to E. W. Beth's semantic tableaus) make clear. Of the present author's verdict that "The Ramist arts of discourse are monologue arts," a verdict writ large in the title ot the book in which the verdict is given, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (1958), Dr. Barth observes that "Ong's words are devastating but they seem to us to be justified" (p. 478).

Dr. Barth's work is based on an impressively sensitive command of a vast array of ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and more recent formal logic, down to the present day, and has a range of implications far beyond what can be explicated in a brief review. Such command has been unrealizable until quite recent times, for only recently have scholars

developed adequate histories of logic, in great part by working their way with Fregean insights through some—but only some—of the vast medieval developments, which Prantl's earlier pioneering work on the history of logic had failed to comprehend. Unfortunately, the mastery so brilliantly in evidence in Dr. Barth's work is still rare elsewhere—a fact which makes her work all the more welcome.

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Religion and Philosophy. By Frederick C. Copleston, S.J. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974. Pp. x + 195. $16.00.

Readers who are familiar only with Frederick C. Copleston's eight-volume *A History of Philosophy* will be pleased with this latest offering from that author. In *Religion and Philosophy,* Copleston gives a detailed, speculative analysis of the relationship between theology and metaphysics. He provides a contemporary approach to a problem that had perplexed many medieval thinkers. With the rise of Protestantism and modern philosophical thought, the assumption arose that philosophy and theology were in conflict with each other. That is, one was either a philosopher or a theologian, and one could not be both. The major thesis of Copleston's present work is that the relationship of philosophy and theology needs to be reexamined. The conclusion of his examination is that the two disciplines need not be in conflict and that the human being's very finitude leads him to affirm the existence of an Absolute.

The work is divided into two somewhat equal parts. Part I (Chapters 1-5) contains five of six lectures given by the author in 1969 at the University of Dundee. Part II (Chapters 6-10) is a reprint of articles which appeared in the *Heythrop Journal* in 1960-61. The chronological order is reversed; but, as the author explains, the lectures were intended for a general audience so that no one topic is developed at length. The *Heythrop Journal* articles, on the other hand, are an extended reflection on transcendent metaphysics, "...as the human spirit's attempt to appropriate in reflection its own orientation to the Godhead" (p. vii). Despite the somewhat different purposes of these two sets of papers, the present volume is well unified and presents a coherent view of one possible approach to religion and philosophy.

In Chapter One, "The Religious Character of Metaphysics" we find Copleston setting out the general theme of the Dundee lectures: "...the alleged antithesis between the God of religion and the God of philosophers" (p. 1). There are clear instances where there is a clash between these two views of God—e.g., the God of the Old Testament and the God of Spinoza. The first and perhaps unifying thought of both the lectures and the *Heythrop Journal* articles is that "...metaphysical philosophy can express (I do not say necessarily expresses) a genuine religious impulse or orientation of the human mind and spirit" (p. 2).